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
 
The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act
1
 both transcends and transforms financial regulation. The 
immediate setting of the law is by now a familiar one. By 2008, there was 
an urgent need for a fundamental restructuring of federal financial 
regulation, primarily based on three overlapping causes. First, an ongoing 
economic emergency initially rooted in our housing and credit markets, 
which has been succeeded by the collapse of several leading investment 
and commercial banks and insurance companies, dramatic deterioration of 
our stock market indices, and a rapidly deepening recession.
2
 Second, 
 
 
  Joel Seligman is President of the University of Rochester and coauthor with the late Louis 
Loss and Troy Paredes of Securities Regulation (4th ed. 2006–present). 
 1. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. In July 2010 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on nearly party 
line votes, in the House with a 237–192 vote (with three Republicans in the majority) and the Senate 
by a 60–39 vote (with three Republicans, Senators Brown, Collins, and Snow, joining the majority). 
President Obama signed the Act into law on July 21, 2010, asserting ―[p]assing this bill was no easy 
task.‖ Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: ‘No Easy Task’, THE WHITE HOUSE 
BLOG (July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/21/president-obama-signs-
wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.  
 2. In 2007, the housing bubble perceptibly began to burst. In August 2007 Countrywide, the 
largest United States mortgage originator, drew down $11.5 billion from bank backup lines. Bradley 
Keoun, Countrywide Taps $11.5 Billion Credit Line from Banks, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2007, 6:34 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax4Hih1unXTs; Bing El-
Boghdady, No. 1 Home Lender Taps $11.5 Billion Line of Credit, WASH. POST., Aug. 17, 2007, at D1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/16/AR2007081601122. 
html. 
 In October Merrill Lynch recognized a $2.3 billion loss and its CEO, Stan O’Neal, resigned. 
David Ellis, O’Neal Out at Merrill, CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 31, 2007, 4:50 PM), http://money.cnn. 
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serious breakdowns in the enforcement and fraud deterrence missions of 
federal financial regulation, as illustrated by matters involving Bear 
Stearns and the other four then independent investment banks subject to 
the SEC’s former Consolidated Supervised Entities program,3 led to the 
 
 
com/2007/10/30/news/companies/merrill_oneal/index.htm; Merrill CEO: ‘Mistakes’ Led to Huge 
Write-Downs, CNBC.COM (Oct. 24, 2007, 1:47 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/21447591/Merrill_CEO 
_Mistakes_Led_To_Huge_Write_Downs. 
 In November Citigroup wrote down $11 billion on top of $5.9 billion in October and its CEO 
Chuck Prince resigned. Walden Siew, Citi Losses Expose Tip of Billion-Dollar Iceberg, REUTERS 
(Nov. 5, 2007, 3:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/05/us-citigroup-losses-idUSN05177 
48920071105; Embattled Citigroup CEO Resigns, CBSNEWS.COM (Apr. 17, 2009, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/11/04/business/main3450641.shtml. Congress particularly 
focused on subprime mortgages and the crisis in housing. In July 2008 the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, was adopted, authorizing the United 
States government to have broad discretion to provide financial support to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. By 2008 several leading investment and commercial banks were subject to SEC and States 
Attorneys General lawsuits concerning Auction Rate Securities. In 2008 the Commission, NASAA, 
and New York Attorney General Cuomo regulated settlements with Citigroup to redeem $7.3 billion in 
illiquid ARS and pay a $100 million penalty. Citigroup to Buy Back Billions of ARS in Deals With 
SEC, State Regulators, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1249 (2008). 
 3. The inadequacy of the Commission’s consolidated supervised entity program was depicted in 
painful detail in a September 2008 Report from the SEC Off. of Inspector Gen., SEC’s Oversight of 
Bear Stearns and Related Entities: Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Report No. 446-A 
(2008)). On the failure of the Commission’s Consolidated Supervisory Entities Program, see 6 LOUIS 
LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 8.A.3.d.(ii) (4th ed. 2010). 
 Simultaneous with the release of the damning SEC Inspector General report, the Commission 
terminated the CSE program. See Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program, SEC Press Rel. 2008-230 (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec 
.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm. The Release stated in part: 
Chairman Cox made the following statement: 
 The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not 
work. When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it created a significant regulatory 
gap by failing to give to the SEC or any agency the authority to regulate large investment 
bank holding companies, like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, and Bear Stearns. . . . 
 As I have reported to the Congress multiple times in recent months, the CSE program 
was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out 
of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies could withdraw 
from this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate of the 
CSE program, and weakened its effectiveness. 
 The Inspector General of the SEC today released a report on the CSE program’s 
supervision of Bear Stearns, and that report validates and echoes the concerns I have 
expressed to Congress. The report’s major findings are ultimately derivative of the lack of 
specific legal authority for the SEC or any other agency to act as the regulator of these large 
investment bank holding companies.  
 With each of the major investment banks that had been part of the CSE program being 
reconstituted within a bank holding company, they will all be subject to statutory supervision 
by the Federal Reserve. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has 
robust statutory authority to impose and enforce supervisory requirements on those entities. 
Thus, there is not currently a regulatory gap in this area. 
  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/1
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government creation of conservatorships for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac
4
 and the Bernard Madoff case.
5
 Third, a misalignment between 
 
 
The CSE program within the Division of Trading and Markets will now be ending. 
Id.  
 4. On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conservatorship. At that 
time, they owned approximately 50 percent of residential mortgages, or approximately $4 trillion in 
mortgages. The United States ultimately would provide $145 billion to backstop Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac capital shortfalls. $145 Billion and Counting, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2010), http://online 
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703880304575236270385307174.html; Tamara Keith, Panel 
Examines Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Collapse, NPR (May 26, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=127128805. 
 On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection after the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury indicated that emergency funding would not be available to stabilize 
the firm. Lehman Brothers Holdings Files Ch. 11 Petition After Gov’t Denies Funding, 40 SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. (BNA) 1476 (2008). At the time, Lehman was the fourth largest investment bank in the 
United States, with more than 25,000 employees. Three days later, SIPC placed Lehman in SIPA 
liquidation. To Ease Accounts Transfer to Barclays, SIPC to Place Lehman in SIPA Liquidation, id. at 
1477. 
 The turmoil accelerated. The day after Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail, the Department of 
the Treasury orchestrated what was then an $85 billion rescue package for insurance giant AIG. Id. at 
1476. See also Fed Again Invokes Emergency Powers With $37.8 Billion in New Loans to AIG, id. at 
1643. Subsequently this would grow to approximately $182 billion. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-09-975, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Government Assistance Provided to 
AIG (2009), at 27. 
 On the same day Lehman Brothers failed, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch for $50 billion 
in an all stock deal. Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch; Experts See More Concentrated Sector, 40 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1480 (2008). 
 Breathtakingly, in six months, three of the five largest independent investment banks (Bear 
Stearns, Lehman, Merrill) were gone as independent entities. Within a few days, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley converted from investment banks to commercial bank holding companies. Among 
other things, this meant that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York could extend credit ―to provide 
increased liquidity support.‖ Goldman, Morgan Become Banks in Radical Change to Face of Wall 
Street, id. at 1534. 
 On October 3, 2008, Congress adopted a $700 billion financial bill, the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, a few days after the House of 
Representatives had initially defeated a similar bill. Financial Bailout Package Signed Into Law, 
Though Doubts Remain About Effectiveness, id. at 1581. 
 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was most notable for its Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (―TARP‖), which can provide up to $700 billion ―to restore liquidity and stability to 
the financial system of the United States.‖ Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, § 2(1) 122 
Stat. 3765, 3766. 
 5. In December 2008 former NASDAQ stock market chair Bernard Madoff was charged by both 
the SEC and the United States Attorney with perpetrating a massive fraud on his investors. Complaint, 
SEC v. Madoff, 08 Civ. 10, 791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008) (alleging $50 billion Ponzi scheme); 
Complaint, United States v. Madoff, 08 Mag. 2735 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2008) (related criminal complaint). 
 The Madoff case proved a major embarrassment to the SEC. Later in December 2008 SEC Chair 
Christopher Cox issued a release which stated in part: 
I am gravely concerned by the apparent multiple failures over at least a decade to thoroughly 
investigate these allegations or at any point to seek formal authority to pursue them. 
Moreover, a consequence of the failure to seek a formal order of investigation from the 
Commission is that subpoena power was not used to obtain information, but rather the staff 
relied upon information voluntarily produced by Mr. Madoff and his firm. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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federal financial regulation firms and intermediaries. The structure of 
financial regulation that was developed during the 1930s did not keep pace 
with fundamental changes in finance.  
  In the New Deal period, most finance was atomized into separate 
investment banking, commercial banking, or insurance firms. By 
2008 finance was dominated by financial holding companies, which 
operated in each of these types of firms and cognate areas such as 
commodities.  
  In the New Deal period, the challenge of regulating finance was 
domestic. By 2008, when credit markets were increasingly reliant on 
trades originating from abroad, the fundamental challenge was 
increasingly international: major financial institutions traded 
simultaneously throughout the world and information technology 
made international money transfers virtually instantaneous.  
 
 
Press Release, SEC, Statement Regarding Madoff Investigation, SEC Press Rel. 2008-297 (Dec. 16, 
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-297.htm; see also Stephen Labaton, 
SEC Image Suffers In a String of Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008, at B6, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/16secure.html, quoting the senior author. 
Subsequently the New York Times reported: 
 There were 133 prosecutions for securities fraud in the first 11 months of this fiscal year. 
That is down from 437 cases in 2000 and from a high of 513 cases in 2002, when Wall Street 
scandals from Enron to WorldCom led to a crackdown on corporate crime, the data showed. 
 At the S.E.C., agency investigations that led to Justice Department prosecutions for 
securities fraud dropped from 69 to 2000 to just 9 in 2007, a decline of 87 percent, the data 
showed. 
Eric Lichtblau, Federal Cases of Stock Fraud Drop Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/25/business/25fraud.html. 
 The Commission’s Office of Inspector General subsequently released three reports related to the 
Madoff debacle. 
 The first, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme (Public 
Version) (OIG No. 509 Aug. 31, 2009), concluded in part: 
The OIG investigation did find . . . that the SEC received more than ample information in the 
form of detailed and substantive complaints over the years to warrant a thorough and 
comprehensive examination and/or investigation of Bernard Madoff and BMIS for operating 
a Ponzi scheme, and that despite three examinations and two investigations being conducted, 
a thorough and competent investigation or examination was never performed. The OIG found 
that between June 1992 and December 2008 when Madoff confessed, the SEC received six 
substantive complaints that raised significant red flags concerning Madoff’s hedge fund 
operations and should have led to questions about whether Madoff was actually engaged in 
trading. Finally, the SEC was also aware of two articles regarding Madoff’s investment 
operations that appeared in reputable publications in 2001 and questioned Madoff’s unusually 
consistent returns. . . .  
Id. at 20–21 (footnotes omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/1
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  In 1930, approximately 1.5 percent of the American public directly 
owned stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
6
 A report 
estimated that in the first quarter of 2008, approximately 47 percent 
of U.S. households owned equities or bonds.
7
 A dramatic 
deterioration in stock prices affected the retirement plans and the 
livelihood of millions of Americans.  
  In the New Deal period, the choice of financial investments was 
largely limited to stocks, debt, and bank accounts. By 2008 we lived 
in an age of complex derivative instruments, some of which 
experience had shown were not well understood by investors and on 
some occasions by issuers or counterparties.  
  Most significantly, our system of finance was more fragile than 
earlier believed. The web of interdependency that was the hallmark 
of sophisticated trading meant that when a major firm such as 
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, cascading impacts had powerful 
effects on the entire economy. 
The primary enduring response to the 2008–2009 financial meltdown 
was the enactment of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. The Dodd-Frank Act is long—the statutory 
material in H.R. 111-517, the Conference Report that included the final 
bill, is approximately 845 pages. But the length is explicable given there 
are sixteen titles addressing fundamental aspects of bank and bank holding 
company securities, commodities, and mortgage regulation, with detailed 
new material on orderly liquidation authority, creation of a new Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection, regulation of such previously unregulated 
areas as investment advisers to hedge funds and OTC derivatives, 
significant strengthening of payment clearance and settlement, investor 
protection, credit rating agencies, asset-backed securities, corporate 
governance, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
As with the 2008–2009 financial crisis itself, the regulatory response 
was systemic rather than solely focused on specific financial sectors such 
as securities regulation or banking. Notably, the Dodd-Frank Act attempts 
to reduce systemic risk to the United States economy by establishing the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which includes members from the 
Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the newly created Bureau of Consumer Financial 
 
 
 6.  S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). 
 7. Investment Company Institute, Equity and Bond Ownership, 2008, at 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Protection, the SEC, the FDIC, CFTC, the Federal Housing Funding 
Agency, and the National Credit Union Administration Board. The Act 
grants the Council authority to require new capital, liquidity, and risk 
management standards for banks and nonbank financial companies.
8
 
The Dodd-Frank Act directly addresses perceived critical gaps or 
omissions in financial regulation by extending SEC jurisdiction to 
investment advisers to hedge funds and other private equity funds,
9
 
authorizing the CFTC and SEC to regulate OTC derivatives,
10
 and 
enhancing SEC authority to regulate credit rating agencies.
11
 The 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act ushers in a new period in United States 
financial regulation in which the regulatory departments and agencies will 
be less independent of each other, the White House, and Congress. By 
emphasizing financial stability and risk reduction as paramount goals, the 
new legislation stresses the need for regulatory coordination, virtual 
elimination of gaps and omissions, and sufficient regulatory tools to 
optimize early warning and prompt response to a burgeoning crisis. 
But the new general approaches to financial regulation largely build on 
the structure of the old financial regulatory agencies. The Dodd-Frank Act 
strengthens the SEC, the CFTC, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and especially the Federal 
Reserve System and FDIC. Indeed, much of the lengthy text of the Act 
appears to have been written by the staff of these agencies and 
departments. Only one agency—the late unlamented Office of Thrift 
Supervision—has been abolished. Only one new agency—the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection—has been established, although within 
existing agencies and departments, there are a plethora of new required 
offices, as well as broadened jurisdiction. 
This, then, is the paradox of the new financial order: Since the stock 
market crash of 1929–1933, no set of financial regulators was so 
incompetent in predicting a financial catastrophe, so slow in response, so 
rigid in regulatory approach, so inadequate in enforcing existing law as the 
regulators in charge during the 2008 crisis. Yet the principal winners in the 
Dodd-Frank Act are the very same set of financial regulators who so 
spectacularly failed. 
 
 
 8. See discussion LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 3, at ch. 8.A.1. 
 9. Id. at ch. 8.C.2. 
 10. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 7.A.5. (4th ed. 
2010). 
 11. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 3.B.2.b (4th 
ed. 2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/1
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How is it possible to enact more powers for regulators who had 
previously failed? One answer is that the financial meltdown of 2008 and 
2009 was a failure of leadership, not a failure of law. There is some truth 
to this. The abysmal performance of executive branch and Congressional 
leadership has been the subject of much harsh comment. This criticism 
reached an apogee in September 2008 when presidential candidate John 
McCain called for the firing of SEC Chair Christopher Cox, explaining in 
part, ―Mismanagement and greed became the operating standard while 
regulators were asleep at the switch.‖
12
 In that instance, I agreed with the 
Wall Street Journal that this assault was ―false and deeply unfair.‖
13
 
While Cox’s performance will do little to commend itself to financial 
historians, to single him out and ignore much broader causes for the 
financial dysfunction is neither accurate nor fair. Let me suggest a more 
nuanced view that explains more fully why matters went so terribly wrong 
and why the Dodd-Frank Act is a constructive step forward. In the spirit of 
the best work of the SEC, let us go back to Genesis and pose the Talmudic 
question: Why regulate finance? 
The basic answer is that we do not always trust financial markets to 
either avoid financial meltdowns, or to achieve non-fraudulent and 
acceptable outcomes for investors and consumers. Our methods for 
achieving this objective largely have been shaped by a history of episodic 
financial crises. The Federal Reserve System, for example, was established 
in 1913 as a response to the Financial Panic of 1907.
14
 The state securities 
law system was popularized by fraud in Kansas circa 1911.
15
 The New 
Deal’s six federal securities laws were a response to the 1929–1933 stock 
market crash.
16
  
Episodic, specialized financial legislation has the virtue of employing 
focused responses to immediate problems. Hence, federal banking 
regulation addressed the safety and solvency of depository institutions as a 
means to reduce banks runs; the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 
emphasized disclosure to investors and antifraud enforcement as key 
mechanisms to restore confidence in securities markets. Congress also 
emphasized regulatory agencies as the key enforcement mechanism of its 
 
 
 12. McCain’s Scapegoat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A22, available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB122178318884054675.html. 
 13. Id. 
 14. ALLAN MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2004 & 2009). 
 15. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 44–45 (3d ed. 2003). 
 16. See id. chs. 1–7. 
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20th century financial regulatory order with the explicit hope that the 
regulatory agencies would bring the virtues of expertise and dynamic 
rulemaking to address new problems as they evolved. That system failed 
early in the 21st century for many reasons, but I want to emphasize three. 
Part I will address a failure of objectives. Part II will address a failure of 
structure. Finally, Part III will address a failure of resources. 
I. THE NEW OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
The Dodd-Frank Act is most transformative in changing the basic 
objective of federal financial regulation from agency-specific purposes to 
an overarching objective of reducing systemic risk.  
Title I of the Act establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council
17
 
and charges the Council in §112(a)(1) of Dodd-Frank: 
 (A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States 
that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or 
ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies 
or nonbank financial companies, or that could arise outside the 
financial services marketplace;  
 (B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on 
the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such 
companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the 
event of failure; and  
 (C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United 
States financial system. 
The emphasis in the Council’s duties18 is on monitoring and deterrence 
rather than crisis management, which is largely delegated to the Federal 
Reserve Board and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
Section 113(a)(1) authorizes the Council on a vote of no fewer than 
two-thirds of the voting members then serving, including an affirmative 
vote of the Chairperson, to require that a United States nonbank financial 
company, such as an investment bank or stock market, be supervised by 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and subject to prudential 
standards as defined in § 115 if ―the Council determines that material 
financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, 
scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the 
 
 
 17. § 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 18. § 112(a)(2). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/1
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activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to 
the financial stability of the United States.‖19 
This represents a significant, but uncertain, power for the Council. If 
exercised broadly, the powers of the Council will be concomitantly 
greater. If not exercised or exercised sparingly, the Council largely will 
focus on banks and bank holding companies.
20
 
Enhanced prudential standards are a pivotal risk reduction technique in 
the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 115(b)(1) provides: 
The recommendations of the Council . . . may include— 
(A) risk-based capital requirements; 
(B) leverage limits; 
(C) liquidity requirements; 
(D) resolution plan and credit exposure report requirements;  
(E) concentration limits; 
(F) a contingent capital requirement; 
(G) enhanced public disclosures; 
(H) short-term debt limits; and  
(I) overall risk management requirements.
21
 
There will be considerable uncertainty as to how effective the Council 
will be until these prudential regulatory standards are developed, 
implemented, and sustained over time. To put it simply, the Council will 
either be a more effective coordinator of federal financial regulation, or a 
more narrowly focused coordinator, depending largely on its rulemaking, 
particularly concerning prudential regulatory standards. 
In a crisis, the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC become the 
operational executors of the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions to reduce 
systemic risk. Upon an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting 
members of the Council then serving, § 121 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 
 19. § 113(q)(1). Section 113(a)(2) elaborates on the considerations the Council must consider in 
making this determination.  
 20. Section 113(b) provides a similar aproach to foreign nonbank financial companies. See 
definition of a foreign nonbank financial company in § 102(a)(4)(A). 
 Section 113(c) authorizes the Federal Reserve to supervise the financial activities of any company 
incorporated or organized in the United States or abroad when the Council on a two-thirds vote, 
including an affirmative vote of the Chairperson, determines that that company’s material financial 
distress ―would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.‖ 
 21. § 115(b)(1). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to take actions to mitigate risks 
posed by a covered bank holding company or nonbank financial company 
when such a company ―poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the 
United States.‖22 
Title II buttresses the ability of the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and federal financial regulatory agencies to reduce systemic risk 
by vesting both the FDIC generally with respect to covered financial 
companies, and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
23
 with 
respect to a subset of financial companies that are covered broker-dealers, 
with orderly liquidation authority.
24
 The purpose of Title II is ―to provide 
the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a 
significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner 
that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.‖25 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act separately amends §13 of the Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956, to establish a modified version of what is 
popularly known as the Volcker Rule.
26
 As enacted, the Volcker Rule 
 
 
 22. § 121(a). The Board is directed to: 
 (1) limit the ability of the company to merge with, acquire, consolidate with, or otherwise 
become affiliated with another company;  
 (2) restrict the ability of the company to offer a financial product or products;  
 (3) require the company to terminate one or more activities;  
 (4) impose conditions on the manner in which the company conducts 1 or more activities; 
or  
 (5) if the Board of Governors determines that the actions described in paragraphs (1) 
through (4) are inadequate to mitigate a threat to the financial stability of the United States in 
its recommendation, require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance-
sheet items to unaffiliated entities. 
Id. Section 165 authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to establish more stringent prudential standards 
for nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board and bank holding companies with total 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more ―[i]n order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial 
stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure, or ongoing 
activities, of large, interconnected financial institutions.‖ 
 Significantly, § 165(j) directs the Federal Reserve to require each covered bank holding company 
or each supervised nonbank financial company to maintain a debt to equity ratio of no more than 15 to 
1, but the Federal Reserve Board only is required to do so, ―upon a determination by the Council that 
such company poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States and that the imposition 
of such requirement is necessary to mitigate the risk that such company poses to the financial stability 
of the United States. Nothing in this paragraph shall apply to a federal home loan bank.‖ 
 23. 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 8.B.5 (3d ed. rev. 2003). 
 24. §§ 204, 205.  
 25. § 204(a). 
 26. Specifically, § 619 (§ 13(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956) provides:  
Unless otherwise provided in this section, a banking entity shall not— 
 (A) engage in proprietary trading; or  
 (B) acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a 
hedge fund or a private equity fund. 
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limits banks and bank holding companies from much proprietary trading 
and participating in private equity funds above a 3 percent de minimis 
threshold.
27
  
The Dodd-Frank Act also addresses several key omissions or gaps in 
the earlier financial order. Title IV of the Act requires most investment 
advisers to hedge funds and other private funds to register with the SEC 
under the Investment Advisers Act.
28
 Title VII of Dodd-Frank divides 
regulation of swap transactions between the SEC (for security-based 
swaps) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (for other 
covered swaps).
29
 
The objective of the Dodd-Frank Act, while complex in articulation 
and implementation, is straightforward conceptually: All important 
financial activities in the United States should be subject to an ultimate 
financial regulator for the purpose of significantly reducing systemic risk. 
There is much to commend in this approach. In contrast to the 
increasingly makeshift approach before Dodd-Frank, the new Act provides 
more effective coordination,
30
 establishes pivotal new powers for the 
 
 
Section 13(a)(2) solely is addressed to nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve 
Board and provides: 
Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that engages in proprietary trading 
or takes or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge 
fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), to 
additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative limits with regards to such 
proprietary trading and taking or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest 
in or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private equity fund, except that permitted activities as 
described in subsection (d) shall not be subject to the additional capital and additional 
quantitative limits except as provided in subsection (d)(3), as if the nonbank financial 
company supervised by the Board were a banking entity. 
This is not the Volcker Rule, but a specification of potential additional capital requirements. A former 
investment bank holding company that became a bank holding company such as Goldman Sachs does 
gain greater access to Federal Reserve Board support, but must comply with the Volcker Rule. 
 The different treatment of nonbank financial companies creates uncertainty as to how effective 
this provision will be. A bank or bank holding company apparently can reconstitute some or all of its 
assets in a separate nonbank entity or be subject to new regulation standards but not the Volcker Rule. 
In a formal sense this may be logical—a nonbank entity does not receive FDIC guarantees (although it 
may receive SIPC guarantees). But this approach begs the question: if the Volcker Rule, as modified, 
is intended to reduce systemic risk, is this the wisest way to do so? 
 27. § 619 (§ 13(d)(4) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956). 
 28. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at ch. 8.C.2.  
 29. 5 LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 10, at ch. 7.A.5. 
 30. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) did 
provide some coordination. 
 The PWG, chaired by the Treasury Secretary and consisting of the chairmen of the Federal 
Reserve Board, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, for example, in 2007 
issued a set of principles and guidelines concerning private pools of capital, which include hedge 
funds. A copy of the Agreement Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and 
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Financial Stability Oversight Council, reduces gaps and omissions that had 
proven quite problematic, and enacts some substantive limits, such as that 
on debt-to-equity ratios, which should, in fact, reduce financial risk. 
How well the Act will work will turn on the skill of the Council and an 
enduring array of regulatory agencies in implementing the complex and as 
yet largely undefined rulemaking and enforcement processes created under 
the new law. Over time, there will be several challenges to the wisdom of 
focusing on systemic risk. 
First, this is today’s crisis. How well will the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council adjust to future crises? This is a nontrivial question. 
The next great risk to our financial order is most likely to concern 
international coordination in response to a future crisis. There is precious 
little in the Act which addresses any international dimension of finance. 
Second, despite all its new powers and authority, will the Council 
prove to be simply a study group with the real power remaining in the 
Department of the Treasury and the subsidiary regulatory agencies? Again, 
this question is nontrivial. The Council will meet only occasionally, does 
not have the type of staff that the agencies typically do, is chaired by the 
Secretary of the Treasury rather than an independent individual, and is 
entirely dependent upon other agencies for enforcement. As with the much 
criticized Director of National Intelligence, who supervises United States 
intelligence agencies but has relatively little power of his or her own,
31
 at 
its worst, the Financial Stability Oversight Council could become a 
relatively toothless watchdog. 
Third, how do the constituent Department of the Treasury and 
regulatory agencies effectively harmonize their enduring and typically 
industry specific objectives with those of the Dodd-Frank Act? Here, the 
new Act is not particularly helpful.  
Section 119 does authorize the Council to make recommendations to 
resolve a dispute among two or more of its members, when ―a member 
agency has a dispute with another member agency about the respective 
jurisdiction over a particular bank holding company, nonbank financial 
company, or financial activity or product. . . .‖32 Recommendations under 
 
 
Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital is available on the Treasury Department’s Web site at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hp272_principles.pdf.  
 31. An overview of the United States Intelligence Community Prepared by the Director for the 
111th Cong. (2009) highlights that, although the Director oversees and directs the implementation of 
the National Intelligence Program and serves as the head of the Intelligence Community, he currently 
has no direct powers to address hiring or firing the leaders of constituent intelligence agencies such as 
the Central Intelligence Agency or to address their budgets. 
 32. § 119(a)(1). 
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§ 119(c)(3) require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the voting 
members of the Council then serving, but are not binding ―on the Federal 
agencies that are parties to the dispute.‖33 
The Council, in other words, is a mediator, not an arbitrator. How 
much effect this provision will have in reducing the disputes that have 
bedeviled the SEC, the CFTC, and depository regulatory institutions in 
resolving competing jurisdictions is uncertain.
34
 This heavily 
compromised provision may end up delivering far less than anticipated. 
For example, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the most 
controversial part of the Dodd-Frank Act, is intended to address areas 
where the federal and state banking agencies woefully failed. The financial 
meltdown of 2008–2009 started with mortgage practices which in 
retrospect no serious person is prepared to defend. But a new agency 
whose focus is on protecting consumers ―from unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts and practices and from discrimination‖35 runs a substantial 
risk of conflict with the long established banking regulators whose mission 
is quite different, namely, protecting the safety and solvency of banks. 
Here, a more effectively empowered Financial Stability Oversight Council 
would have been wiser.  
II. THE NEW STRUCTURE 
To put this in different terms, what the Dodd-Frank Act implicitly 
envisions is a new form of regulatory federalism. Will this new structure 
work? 
In March 2008 the Department of the Treasury published ―Blueprint 
for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.‖36 At the time I thought 
the Blueprint was unrealistic.
37
 The Report proposed short-term 
recommendations, intermediate-term recommendations, and an optimal 
long term regulatory framework for the United States insurance industry 
holding assets totaling $6 trillion at the end of 2006, the United States 
banking sector with total assets of $12.6 trillion, and the United States 
securities sector with gross assets of $12.4 trillion, as well as the United 
States commodities industry, among other cognate topics.
38
 
 
 
 33. § 119(d). 
 34. See, e.g., LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 10, at 442–48. 
 35. § 1021(b)(2) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 36. The Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure 
(Mar. 2008).  
 37. See Joel Seligman, The SEC in a Time of Discontinuity, 95 VA. L. REV. 667 (2009). 
 38. See supra note 34, at 165. 
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The most significant short-term recommendations proposed include:  
  Modernization of the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets (PWG) to enhance its effectiveness as a coordinator of 
financial regulatory policy, primarily by (1) broadening its focus to 
include the entire financial sector, rather than only financial 
markets; (2) facilitating better inter-agency coordination and 
communication in mitigating systemic risk to the financial system, 
enhancing market integrity, promoting consumer and investor 
protection, and supporting capital markets’ efficiency and 
competitiveness; and (3) expanding the PWG membership, which 
currently includes the Secretary of the Treasury, who acts as Chair 
of the PWG, and the chairs of the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the 
CFTC, with the proposed addition of the heads of the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision.
39
  
  A new Mortgage Origination Commission to address the high levels 
of delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures among subprime 
borrowers in 2007 and 2008 and develop uniform minimum 
licensing qualifications for state mortgage market participants.
40
  
The intermediate-term recommendations notably included:  
  Within two years, phasing out the federal thrift charter and requiring 
thrifts to secure a national bank charter and closing the Office of 
Thrift Supervision.
41
  
  Creating a new system of federal regulation administered by the 
Federal Reserve to address payment and settlement systems.
42
  
  Establishing an optional federal charter for insurers which would 
solely be subject to federal regulation and supervision while 
continuing state insurance regulation for those insurers who did not 
elect to be regulated at the national level.
43
  
 
 
 39. Id. at 5–6, 75–77. 
 40. Id. at 11–13, 106–26.  
 41. Id. at 8–9, 89–100.  
 42. Id. at 9, 100–06.  
 43. Id. at 9–11, 126–33.  
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  Merging the SEC and CFTC, both in the sense of a structural merger 
and a merger of regulatory philosophies.
44
 
This alone was a breathtaking agenda, but there were even more 
ambitious proposals for an optimal long term regulatory structure. This 
proposed structure was inspired by the objectives-based approach used in 
Australia and the Netherlands,
45
 and ultimately would restructure the 
financial structure to:  
  Transform the Federal Reserve into the Market Stability Regulator, 
continuing its current role with respect to monetary policy and the 
provision of liquidity to the financial system and adding new 
responsibilities to supervise federal insured depository institutions, 
federal insurance institutions, and federal financial services 
providers.
46
  
  Create a new Prudential Financial Regulatory Agency to supervise 
financial institutions with some type of explicit government 
guarantees, including federal deposit insurance and state-established 
insurance guarantee funds, and assume the role of current federal 
prudential regulation now conducted by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision.
47
 
  Create a new Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency to monitor 
business conduct regulation across all types of financial firms, 
including federal insured depository institutions, federal insurance 
institutions, and federal financial services providers, and to be 
responsible for consumer protection, business practices, standards 
for entry into the financial services industry, and for sales and 
service practices. The new Agency would also address broker-
dealers, hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and 
mutual funds, and would develop standards that address such topics 
as net capital, public disclosures, testing, training, fraud, 
manipulation, and such duties to customers as best execution and 
suitability.
48
 
 
 
 44. Id. at 6–7, 78–83. 
 45. Id. at 13–14, 137–46. 
 46. Id. at 15–17, 146–56. 
 47. Id. at 17–19, 157–70. 
 48. Id. at 19–21, 170–80. There would remain a role for self-regulatory organizations. The 
standards developed by the Conduct of Business Regulatory Agency would apply both to nationally-
chartered and state-chartered firms. 
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  The SEC would be succeeded by a new Conduct of Business 
Regulatory Agency and by a new Corporate Finance Regulator to 
assume the Commission’s current responsibilities with respect to 
corporate disclosures, corporate governance, accounting, and similar 
issues.
49
 
The Dodd-Frank Act is similar in some respects to the Treasury 
Department Blueprint—it does modernize the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets and terminates the Office of Thrift Supervision—but 
strikingly different in avoiding comprehensive restructuring of federal 
financial regulation.
50
 
I believe that this makes good sense. For as dreadful as the 
performance of the regulatory agencies was in the period up to and 
including the 2008–2009 financial meltdown, the Dodd-Frank Act 
deserves some credit for preserving what did generally work in the earlier 
system. There are powerful advantages to focused agencies such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or more recently, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
51
 
The broader an agency’s jurisdiction, the more likely it is to lack the 
resources or focus to address all appropriate priorities. A significant 
illustration of this involved the SEC during the late 1990s. Given a 
challenging political context and inadequate budget, the Commission’s 
ongoing review of periodic disclosure documents such as Form 10-Ks 
badly deteriorated. In October 2002 a staff report of the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee, for example, found that in FY 2001 the 
Division of Corporation Finance was able to complete a full review of 
only 2,280 of 14,600 Form 10-K annual reports, roughly 16 percent, far 
short of the Division’s stated goal to review every company’s annual 
report at least once every three years. ―Of more than 17,300 public 
companies, approximately 9200 or 53%, have not had their Form 10-Ks 
reviewed in the past three years.‖52 Enron, by then a notorious example of 
staff neglect, had last received a partial review of its Form 10-K annual 
report in 1997, and had been last subject to a full review in 1991.
53
 The 
 
 
 49. Id. at 21. 
 50. The Dodd-Frank Act, in contrast, is much more similar to the June 2009 proposals of the 
Obama Administration. See The Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New 
Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation (2009). 
 51. See SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 97–100, concerning the creation of the SEC. 
 52. Report of the Staff to the Senate Comm. On Gov’t Affairs, Financial Oversight of Enron: The 
SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs 13, 31–32 (Oct. 8, 2002).  
 53. Id. at 13, 31–32.  
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argument can be made that had the SEC had the resources available to run 
the Division of Corporation Finance at more appropriate levels, the 
PCAOB might not have been needed. 
The creation of the PCAOB, however, ensured that there would be one 
federal agency solely responsible for audit quality. The Board, unlike the 
SEC of the 1990s, had a narrow and focused agenda and did not have to 
balance using resources for audit review with a broad array of other 
priorities, such as market regulation, broker-dealer and investment adviser 
regulation, new securities offerings, municipal and governmental 
securities dealers, and enforcement. The first SEC Chair, Joseph Kennedy, 
memorably observed in 1935 that ―I’d hate to go out of here thinking I had 
just made some changes in accounting practices.‖54 It is reasonable to 
assume that no one at the PCAOB has ever derogated improving auditing 
practices. 
This point should not be overstated. The narrower an agency’s agenda, 
the less likely it will be to galvanize White House or Congressional 
support for its budget and administrative priorities. A well-focused agency 
runs the risk of being lost in the alphabet of federal agencies, subject, like 
the SEC too often has been, to a boom and bust cycle of budgetary and 
legislative support, with effective support most likely only in times of 
crisis. 
The challenge is to find the right balance between expertise, which is a 
consequential virtue of a well-run regulatory agency, and effectiveness, 
which often can be better achieved by reducing the number of responsible 
agencies and increasing resources for each. There is no algebraic formula 
to achieve this balance. 
The Dodd-Frank Act retains and strengthens most of the earlier 
regulatory agencies but attempts to coordinate them through the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council. Throughout the Act, the SEC, for example, is 
defined to be the primary financial regulatory agency for each person or 
function earlier subject to its jurisdiction or added by Dodd-Frank.
55
 To 
analogize to European history, what appears to be present in Dodd-Frank 
is a weak monarch-strong noble system of governance. But that analogy 
misses the other big winner in the Act: Congress. Never in the history of 
financial regulation has Congress been so insistent on micromanaging 
financial regulatory agencies. Let me illustrate by focusing on the SEC. 
 
 
 54. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 116–17. 
 55. See § 2(12)(B). 
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The Dodd-Frank Act specifies several new Commission committees, 
offices, and studies. Under § 39 of the Securities Exchange Act, the 
Commission is directed to establish an Investor Advisory Committee with 
not fewer than ten or more than twenty members in addition to an Investor 
Advocate, a representative of state securities commissions and a 
representative of senior citizens.
56
 
As added by § 915 of the Dodd-Frank Act, § 4(g) of the Securities 
Exchange Act establishes a new Office of the Investor Advocate who 
reports directly to the Chairman.
57
 Section 919D of the Dodd-Frank Act 
adds a new § 4(g)(8) to the 1934 Act to direct the Investor Advocate to 
appoint an ombudsman who reports directly to the Investor Advocate.
58
 
Section 15E(p), as amended by § 932 of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
establishes an Office of Credit Ratings, which, among other things, must 
conduct an examination of each nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization at least annually.
59
 Section 979 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
establishes an Office of Municipal Securities.
60
 
Section 967 of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC not later than 
ninety days after the Act’s enactment to hire an independent consultant  
of high caliber and with expertise in organizational restructuring 
and . . . capital markets to examine the internal operations, structure, 
funding, and the need for comprehensive reform of the SEC, as well 
as the SEC’s relationship with and the reliance on self-regulatory 
organizations and other entities relevant to the regulation of 
securities and the protection of securities investors that are under 
the SEC’s oversight.61 
Section 968 directs the Comptroller General of the United States to 
conduct a study of the ―revolving door,‖ that is, employees who leave the 
SEC to work for financial institutions, and to submit a report on the results 
of that study to specific Congressional Oversight Committees not later 
than one year after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.
62
 
Section 961 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC, not later than 
ninety days after the end of each fiscal year, to submit to the 
Congressional Oversight Committees a report on the conduct of 
 
 
 56. Securities Exchange Act § 39(b) 15 U.S.C. § 78pp (added by § 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
 57. § 915.  
 58. § 919D.  
 59. § 932(a)(8). 
 60. § 979.  
 61. § 967(a)(1).  
 62. § 968.  
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examinations of registered entities, enforcement investigations, and review 
of corporate financial securities filings.
63
 Notably, this includes an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal supervisory controls of the 
SEC.
64
 
Section 962 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Comptroller General 
report on the quality of SEC personnel management once every three 
years.
65
 
Section 963(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that, ―not later than 
six months after the end of each fiscal year,‖ the SEC submit a report to 
Congress that: 
(A) describes the responsibility of the management of the 
Commission for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and  
(B) contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal 
control structure and procedures for financial reporting of the 
Commission during that fiscal year.
66
 
Section 4D of the 1934 Act was added by § 966 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to add a hotline to receive:  
(A) suggestions by employees of the Commission for improvements 
in the work efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity, and the use 
of resources, of the Commission; and 
(B) allegations by employees of the Commission of waste, abuse, 
misconduct, or mismanagement within the Commission.
67
 
Section 989A of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes $8 million per year to 
support a program of senior investor protection, including grants to states 
for enhanced protection of seniors (those sixty-two years old or older).
68
 
Section 989F of the Dodd-Frank Act directs the Comptroller General, 
within one year of enactment, to conduct a study of person-to-person 
lending and to submit a report on that study to Congressional Oversight 
Committees, ―with particular attention to‖: 
 
 
 63. § 961.  
 64. § 961(b).  
 65. § 962.  
 66. § 963(a)(1). The Comptroller General is directed to conduct essentially the same study in 
§ 963(b). 
 67. § 966, adding § 40 to the Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78d-4); quoted language 
from § 40(a)(1).  
 68. § 989A.  
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(i) the application of the Securities Act of 1933 to person to person 
lending platforms;  
(ii) the posting of consumer loan information on the EDGAR 
database of the Commission; and  
(iii) the treatment of privately held person to person lending 
platforms as public companies.
69
 
Section 989E of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a Council of 
Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, including the SEC’s Inspector 
General.
70
 
From the Commission’s point-of-view, the Inspector General has 
evolved into a veritable ―spy in the house of love,‖ to paraphrase an Anaïs 
Nin title. During six months in 2010, the Commission’s Inspector General 
completed six audit investigations and evaluations and thirty-four 
reports.
71
 Some, like the Inspector General’s report on Bear Stearns,
72
 
were important and prompted long overdue corrective action. 
Cumulatively, the total number of Inspector General reports and 
recommendations is wearisome, prompting the Commission to spend a 
great deal of time defending itself which could better be spent preventing 
securities fraud. Nevertheless, the Inspector General now appears to be 
here to stay and will continue to command Commission resources long 
into the future. 
On top of this, the most striking of all the Dodd-Frank Act demands 
was the number of new rulemakings required by the Act. In all, the law 
firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell calculated that Dodd-Frank will require 
the SEC to engage in at least ninety-five separate rulemakings.
73
 
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S BIGGEST FAILURE: RESOURCES 
The significance of the Dodd-Frank Act’s demands for new offices, 
new rules, new studies, and seemingly endless responsibilities to comply 
with a reenergized SEC Inspector General would resonate differently if the 
Act had provided the Commission with sufficient resources to take on its 
 
 
 69. § 989F (quoted language from subsection (a)(3)).  
 70. § 989E.  
 71. SEC Off. of Ins. Gen., Semiannual Rep. to Cong., Apr. 1, 2010–Sept. 30, 2010, at 87–99. 
 72. See supra note 3, Report No. 446-A. 
 73. Davis Polk & Wardwell, Summary of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010, at ii. 
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new responsibilities and adjust its staff size in times of greater financial 
activity. Here, the Act most conspicuously failed. 
For a considerable period, it has been clear that the largest reason 
independent regulatory agencies are not consistently independent nor 
sufficiently effective involves their budgets.
74
 A core issue during Arthur 
Levitt’s 1993–2000 Chairmanship, for example, was resources. Between 
FY 1993 and FY 2000, the SEC budget grew from $253.2 million to 
$382.4 million or an average of 6% per year.
75
 Staff positions grew from 
3,083 to 3,235 or an average of less than 1% per year.
76
 During the 1990s’ 
bull market, virtually every significant measure of securities activity grew 
far faster. Between 1993 and 2000, for example, the dollar value of 
securities filed for registration grew from $868 billion to $2.3 trillion,
77
 an 
average increase of 24% per year; the number of underwritten securities 
more than doubled in the shorter period of 1993 to 1999 (increasing from 
6,443 to 13,923).
78
 Similarly, the dollar value of investment companies 
grew from $2.4 trillion in 1993 to $6.7 trillion in 2002,
79
 an average 
annual increase of 21.3%; and the number of investment company 
portfolios grew from 21,200 to 31,100 during the same period, an average 
annual increase of 5.1%.
80
 ―In calendar year 1992, the [SEC] supervised 
over 8,200 broker-dealers with 34,000 branch offices and 427,000 
registered representatives . . . .‖
81
 By 2001, the number of registered 
broker-dealers had declined to 7,900, but the number of branch offices had 
increased to approximately 87,765 (an average annual increase of 17.6%) 
and the number of registered representatives had grown to approximately 
683,240 (an average annual increase of 6.7%).
82
 The value of stock listed 
on all exchanges approximately tripled between 1992 and 2000 (increasing 
from $3.97 trillion to $11.73 trillion).
83
 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 
NOVA L. REV. 233 (2004). 
 75. 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 150; 2000 SEC Ann. Rep. 159. 
 76. 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 150; 2000 SEC Ann. Rep. 159. 
 77. Compare 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 51, with 2000 SEC Ann. Rep. 70. 
 78. Sec. Indus. Ass’n. Securities Industry Fact Book 12 (2002), available at http://archives2.si 
fma.org/research/pdf/2002Fact_Book.pdf.  
 79. Compare 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 38, with 2002 SEC Ann. Rep. 53. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 1993 SEC Ann. Rep. 24. 
 82. 2001 SEC Ann. Rep. 34. 
 83. 2001 SEC Ann. Rep. 169. 
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In 2009 the Commission’s Draft Strategic Plan for FY 2010–2015 
highlighted that the binge-purge approach that had characterized the 
SEC’s budget in the post-World War II period has continued: 
Between FY 2001 and FY 2005, Congress more than doubled the 
SEC’s funding level to increase significantly the agency’s 
workforce and technology program after the enactment of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Then, the SEC experienced flat or 
declining budgets between FY 2005 and FY 2007, resulting in a 10 
percent reduction in its workforce and curtailing its investments in 
new or enhanced information technology systems. Although the FY 
2008 and FY 2009 budgets enacted by Congress have permitted the 
agency to begin restoring these losses, as of FY 2009 the SEC is 
still operating below the levels of staff and new IT investments from 
earlier in the decade.
84
 
Because the Commission is financed by Congressional appropriations, 
it has long been trapped in a budgetary vise, frequently without enough 
staff members to police illegal activity. After a legendary start in the New 
Deal era, when the Commission was considered a model independent 
regulatory agency, its staff declined from 1,678 in 1941 to 667 in 1955.
85
 
The SEC’s capacity to review corporate filings and market activity 
deteriorated, and predictably, the late 1950s were marked by a resurgence 
of fraud, particularly on the American Stock Exchange. In response, 
Congress added 250 staff members in 1961 and broadened the 
Commission’s jurisdiction, including a new program to investigate insider 
trading, which helped lead to a significant rebound in its performance.
86
 
The SEC, like most independent regulatory agencies, submits its 
budget to the White House Office of Management and Budget, which 
consolidates several agency budgets into a single request. Congress 
ultimately must both ―authorize‖ and ―appropriate‖ agency expenditures.
87
 
The pre-Dodd-Frank Act budget model was fairly criticized for 
underfunding the SEC, particularly during periods of surges in market 
activity.
88
 It was an erratic model. After periods of crisis, such as that 
 
 
 84. SEC Draft Strategy Plan for FY 2010–2015 (2009), at 6. 
 85. See Seligman, supra note 74, at 255. 
 86. SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at chs. 9–10. 
 87. See generally 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 7.22 (Supp. 
1997). 
 88. See generally Seligman, supra note 74, at 253. 
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which eventuated in the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
89
 Congress and the 
President have been willing to make dramatic adjustments to the SEC’s 
budget. In July 2002, for example, Congress ―authorized,‖ but did not 
subsequently appropriate, a 66% increase in the Commission’s budget.
90
 
To Chairman Levitt, the answer to boom-bust budgeting was agency self-
funding, such as that which has long operated at the most effective 
independent regulatory agency, the Federal Reserve Board.
91
 
The SEC already had in place an effective fee collection mechanism 
which in 2000 and 2001, for example, collected over $2 billion each 
year.
92
 Each of these year’s collections exceeds even the most ambitious 
SEC budget proposals for 2003 and 2004. If they did not, fee levels could 
have been adjusted. A movement to self-funding does not raise questions 
of feasibility. SEC self-funding would likely reduce the extremes that have 
been evident in the appreciable OMB-Congressional process, and to some 
extent depoliticize budgeting. 
A difficult question is not feasibility nor need, but accountability. Who 
would watch the guardians? At the Federal Reserve Board, a 
straightforward accountability system is in place.
93
  
 
 
 89. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 750. 
 90. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 510 n.139 (2002). 
 91. A Federal Reserve website usefully explains: 
How is the Federal Reserve funded? 
The Federal Reserve’s income is derived primarily from the interest on U.S. government 
securities that it trades through open market operations. Other sources of income are the 
interest on foreign currency investments held by the System; fees received for services 
provided to depository institutions, such as check clearing, funds transfers, and automated 
clearinghouse operations; and interest on loans to depository institutions (the rate on which is 
the so-called discount rate). 
After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of its earnings over to the U.S. 
Treasury.  
FAQs, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, http://www.richmondfed.org/faqs/frs/ (last visited Sept. 
27, 2011). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2000). About 95 percent of the Reserve Banks’ net earnings 
have been paid into the Treasury since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914. (Income 
and expenses of the Federal Reserve Banks are included in the annual report of the Board of 
Governors). 
 92. 2001 SEC Ann. Rep. 170, tbl. 16. 
 93. Under 12 U.S.C. § 243, the Federal Reserve Board is empowered to: 
levy semiannually upon the Federal reserve banks, in proportion to their capital stock and 
surplus, an assessment sufficient to pay its estimated expenses and the salaries of its members 
and employees for the half year succeeding the levying of such assessment, together with any 
deficit carried forward from the preceding half year and such assessments may include 
amounts sufficient to provide for the acquisition by the Board in its own name of such site or 
building in the District of Columbia as in its judgment alone shall be necessary for the 
purpose of providing suitable and adequate quarters for the performance of its functions.  
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Congress has two accountability mechanisms. First, under 12 U.S.C. 
§ 248(a), there is an annual independent audit of the financial statement of 
the Board (as well as each Federal Reserve Bank).
94
 Second, Congress 
retains its general oversight and legislative powers with respect to the 
Board.
95
 
The Federal Reserve Board’s self-funding has been the key to its 
historic high level of performance, its professionalism, and its ability to 
withstand political pressures. The alternative approach would require the 
Fed to seek annual budget approval from Congress. At that point, its 
ability to maintain independence would be reduced. 
The Senate initially was persuaded by this type of argument, and would 
have enacted a form of self-funding for the SEC in § 991 of the Senate bill 
of what became the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act.
96
 Specifically, the Commission would have been 
authorized to prepare and deliver its own budget to Congress, which 
would not have been ―a request for appropriations.‖
97
  
In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress rejected self-funding for the SEC in 
the enacted version of § 991. Congress did authorize significant increases 
to the SEC’s budget in amended § 35 of the Securities Exchange Act: for 
fiscal year 2011, $1,300,000,000; growing in steps to $2,250,000,000 in 
fiscal year 2015.
98
 The Commission also was granted up to $100 million 
in a reserve fund to be established in the Department of the Treasury. 
These funds may be directly obligated by the Commission.
99
 
The frailty of the post-Dodd-Frank Act SEC budget process is already 
evident. It is clear that Congress will not appropriate the amounts 
authorized in the Dodd-Frank Act during the 112th Congress. SEC 
officials have begun explaining how budget pressures are already 
 
 
 94. See 12 U.S.C. § 2480(a). 
 95. See id. § 248. 
 96. S. 3217, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 29, 2010). 
 97. Id. § 991(a)(1). 
 98. § 991(c).  
 99. Securities Exchange Act § 4(i)(3), amended by § 991(e)(1). The Conference report, H.R. 
Rep. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), stressed: 
Securities and Exchange Commission Match Funding maintains the role of the 
Appropriations Committees in setting the Securities and Exchange Commission’s annual 
budgets on and after FY2012. Transaction fee receipts would be treated as offsetting 
collections equal to the amount of the appropriation. Any excess collections would go to the 
Treasury as general revenue and not offset any current or future appropriations. 
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hamstringing the Commission’s ability to address its current 
responsibilities.
100
  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The Dodd-Frank Act will succeed, at least as long as memory lasts,
101
 
in reducing systemic risk. It is still too early to tell whether the Act will 
also chill capital formation and how well modulated the costs of the Act 
are to its benefits. But the Act provides a more intelligent structure to 
address our current system of finance than the New Deal model which 
served us so long and so well. 
The lesson for historians is less sanguine. During the 2008–2009 
financial meltdown, the economy went horribly, unexpectedly, wrong. 
There were multiple fail-safes in place. None of them individually or 
collectively worked well enough.  
How could this occur? Academics and other students of finance have 
already begun to describe the mechanics of what went wrong, the inept 
regulatory responses, the blinders caused by political conviction, the 
overwhelming affect of new technology on previously effective systems, 
less transparent systems, and more internationalization.
102
  
But all this does not seem sufficient to explain the second great 
financial catastrophe of the past one hundred years. I speculate that part of 
the crisis may have been the result of both a political and financial system 
that over-rewarded optimism. I can imagine how difficult it must have 
been for any political figure in early 2008 to have insisted that this is a 
terrible crisis, that we cannot persist in business as usual. But that was the 
latest such cries should have occurred. Instead, animal spirits prevailed.
103
 
I am left with a resigned sense that we will never be able to eliminate 
financial cycles as we once thought we could. Indeed, in an increasingly 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., Budget Could Hamstring SEC’s Handling Of Whistleblower Cases, Lawyer 
Suggests, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2332 (2010). Editorial, Running on Empty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
14, 2011, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/opinion/14mon2.html. 
 101. John Kenneth Galbraith memorably wrote:  
―As protection against financial illusion or insanity, memory is far better than law. When the 
memory of the 1929 disaster failed, law and regulation no longer sufficed. For protecting 
people from the cupidity of others and their own, history is highly utilitarian. It sustains 
memory and memory serves the same purpose as the SEC and, on the record, is far more 
effective.‖  
The Great Crash, quoted in SELIGMAN, supra note 15, at 1. 
 102. See, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET (2010), for one of many popular 
accounts. 
 103. To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes. 
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interconnected globalized economy, we are now less able to do so than we 
were before.  
This ultimately fortifies me in supporting the risk-reduction dimensions 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. While the Act is not perfect, it moves in the right 
direction. Let us draw what consolation we can from the French legislative 
admonition, ―let not the perfect be the enemy of the good.‖ 
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